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Abstract. The intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important network security 
tool for securing computer and network systems. It is able to detect and monitor 
network traffic data. Snort IDS is an open-source network security tool. It can 
search and match rules with network traffic data in order to detect attacks, and 
generate an alert. However, the Snort IDS can detect only known attacks. 
Therefore, we have proposed a procedure for improving Snort IDS rules, based 
on the association rules data mining technique for detection of network probe 
attacks. We employed the MIT-DARPA 1999 data set for the experimental 
evaluation. Since behavior pattern traffic data are both normal and abnormal, the 
abnormal behavior data is detected by way of the Snort IDS. The experimental 
results showed that the proposed Snort IDS rules, based on data mining detection 
of network probe attacks, proved more efficient than the original Snort IDS 
rules, as well as icmp.rules and icmp-info.rules of Snort IDS. The suitable 
parameters for the proposed Snort IDS rules are defined as follows: Min_sup set 
to 10%, and Min_conf set to 100%, and through the application of eight variable 
attributes. As more suitable parameters are applied, higher accuracy is achieved. 
Keywords: apriori algorithm; data mining; intrusion detection system; network probe 
attack; network security; Snort IDS rules. 
1 0BIntroduction 
Internet technology has become an important part of daily communication 
through e-mail, social media interaction, e-learning, and so on. Additionally, 
corporations large and small have expanded upon basic Internet communication 
to include intercompany correspondence, direct consumer marketing, and 
internet shopping. Of course, risks are incurred as inefficient and ineffective 
security tools invite attacks from Internet hackers. Prevention technology, such 
as firewalls, antivirus programs, and malicious software removal programs, do 
not provide absolute protection as attackers apply new techniques to assault the 
network and its users [1]-[3]. 
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Network attacks may be divided into four categories [4]: denial of service (DoS) 
attacks, user to root (U2R) attacks, remote to local (R2L) attacks, and network 
probe attacks. DoS attack is characterized by the attacker interrupting or 
denying the user access to a server. Examples of DoS attacks include the 
Mailbomb, Ping of Death, and Neptune. U2R attacks allow an unseen 
‘privileged access’ by extending the permissions of the root, such as those of an 
administrator. The ‘buffer overflow’ attack is the most common form of the 
U2R attack. R2L attacks invade the target system without the owner’s 
permission. Lastly, network probe attacks gather and analyze information in 
order to map the network system. Scanning software programs, such as Nmap, 
Mscan, and Satan, collect information from the network target system (IP 
address, host name, operating system (OS), and service application). Although, 
network probe attacks only collect data, the basic information obtained may be 
used in future attacks of other kinds. This paper focuses on network probe 
attacks. 
Currently, intrusion detection systems (IDS) play an important role in 
maintaining network security. An IDS detects and monitors network traffic data 
on network systems and alerts the user when a malicious attack occurs [5]. IDS 
utilizes rules to search and match network traffic data. There are two techniques 
for intrusion detection: anomaly-based intrusion detection, and misuse-based 
intrusion detection. Furthermore, IDS can be divided into two types: host-based 
intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and network-based intrusion detection 
Systems (NIDS) [2],[6]. Limitations in maintaining network security are based 
on the IDS’s accuracy, self-adaptability, and scalability [7]. 
Data mining has been applied within IDS [8] in an attempt to improve accuracy 
and efficiency, as it can search, analyze, and process discovered information in 
large amounts [9]. Data mining techniques consist of three parts: classification, 
clustering, and association rules [10]. 
In this paper, we propose the improvement of the intrusion detection system 
based on Snort rules for network probe attack detection, utilizing the association 
rules technique of data mining. The association rule technique analyzes the 
network traffic data pattern, after which Snort IDS rules are generated according 
to the network’s traffic data behavior. 
In Section 2, we briefly discuss the Snort IDS and data mining technique as 
applied to the IDS. In Section 3, the backgrounds of the Snort IDS, association 
rules, and the Apriori algorithm are described. The system architecture is 
presented in Section 4, and Section 5 describes the procedure for experimental 
evaluation. Lastly, the conclusion and recommendations for future work are 
presented in Section 6. 
236 Nattawat Khamphakdee 
2 Related Work 
Reviewing several papers that discuss Snort IDS through data mining we find 
the explanation and implementation of intrusion detection systems utilizing a 
Snort-based IDS within the Linux operation system [1],[11]. Within this 
operating system alerts were generated based on the results of Snort IDS 
through the utilization of the Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE). This 
effort assists the administrator in the analysis of the network’s internet 
connection. The intrusion detection system was further implemented with Snort 
and WinPcap, within the Windows operating system [12] and a firewall was 
configured, based on the Windows operating environment. The Snort IDS rules, 
however, were not improved. 
The Snort IDS rules for intrusion detection of network probe attacks were 
improved through the utilization of the MIT-DARPA 1999 dataset in weeks 
four and five [5]. The authors analyzed the network traffic data of the attack by 
applying the Wire Shark software to the dataset. They further compared the 
detection performance of the network probe attacks with the Detection Scoring 
Truth. However, the pattern of the network probe attacks in the dataset required 
additional time to analyze. 
Further utilization of Snort IDS involved monitoring web content in real-time 
for any abnormal behavior patterns within a campus network [13]. The results 
generated in the alert analysis of the Snort IDS, in high-speed networks within a 
campus network [14] demonstrated the highest detection of ICMP PING 
attacks. In designing a Snort IDS model to analyze and pattern match the 
protocol (in order to improve the speed and accuracy of the intrusion detections 
system in the campus network), ACID (Analysis Center Intrusion Detection) 
was chosen to display alarm information [15]. The Snort IDS rules, however, 
were not improved. 
Data mining techniques and data mining algorithms involved in the intrusion 
detection system and the architecture of the data mining have also been 
proposed [7]. A model of an intrusion detection system based on data mining is 
presented and described further in [16]. The authors also proposed modules 
consisting of a data collection module, preprocessing module, detection module, 
and response module. Thus, the design and implementation of an intrusion 
detection system based on data mining utilizing the Apriori algorithm [17] were 
executed. The experiment resulted in the efficient detection of new types of 
attacks. Additionally, an intrusion detection system based on data mining 
technique on database was further introduced [18]. The application of the 
Apriori algorithm extracted user behavior patterns and generated a greater 
efficiency of the Snort IDS Rules. 
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3 The Background 
We discuss the background of Snort IDS, the applicable Association Rules 
Mining, and the process of the Apriori algorithm in three parts. 
3.1 The Background of Snort IDS 
Matin Roesch developed the Snort Intrusion Detection and Prevention System 
(Snort IDS/IPS) in 1998, using C language. It has been downloaded as a 
network security tool over four million times, by approximately 500,000 
registered users [19]-[20]. As an open-source, lightweight software application 
Snort can be installed on numerous operating systems (Linux, Windows, etc.) in 
almost all forms of computer architecture. It can analyze the network traffic 
data in real-time by utilizing the different existing rules of the attack. Snort’s 
components are: packet decoder, preprocessors, detection engine, logging and 
alerting systems, and output modules [12]-[13]. Snort utilizes existing rules, 
which are patterns of known attacks for searching and matching the network 
traffic data. If an abnormal behavior pattern is detected it generates an alert. The 
structure of Snort rules consists of two logical parts [13],[21]. The first part is 
the rule header, while the second is the rule option, as shown in Figure 1. 
The rule header contains the following fields: action, protocol, source address, 
source port, direction, destination address, and destination port, as shown in 
Figure 2. Furthermore, the action field in a Snort rule has three properties: alert, 
log, and pass. The protocol field acts as the criteria where to detect network 
traffic data, which include IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP. The Snort rules contain 
two IP addresses: (1) source and (2) destination. These fields specify the host IP 
address. If we wish to detect every IP address, the field of the IP address is 
defined as “any”. The direction field determines the direction of the network 
traffic data between source and destination, defined as “->”, “<-” and “< >”. 
The port field examines the criteria within the Snort rule to determine the port 
of protocol. Again, if we wish to determine every port, the field of the port is 
defined as “any” [22].  
 
Figure 1 Structure of the Snort IDS Rule. 
Action Protocol Source Address 
Source 
Port Direction 
Destination 
Address 
Destination 
Port 
Figure 2 Structure of Snort IDS Rule Header. 
Rule Header Rule Option 
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Figure 3 Example of Snort IDS Rule. 
The rule options of Snort consist of two parts: a keyword and an argument 
(defined inside parentheses and separated by a semicolon). The keyword 
options are separated from the argument by a colon. A Snort rule can have one 
(or multiple) options within a rule option. Examples of keyword options are 
msg, ttl, tos, and icode. 
An example of the aforementioned Snort IDS rule is shown in Figure 3. If it 
matches the network traffic data of an ICMP protocol field, such as source 
address, source port, destination address, and destination port, for example 
192.168.1.10, any, any, any, respectively, an alert is generated that outputs the 
message ICMP Attempt Attack with the signature ID 1000005. 
3.2 Background of Association Rules Mining 
Generally speaking, the various techniques of data mining can be divided into 
three types: association rules mining, classification, and clustering [10], of 
which association rules mining is the most important type [23]. First introduced 
in Agrawal, et al., 1993 [24], association rules mining is the process of 
extracting relevant information from a large database or data warehouse. This 
may be applied to several research areas, such as medicine, risk management, 
and business. In order to understand the formal statement of the association 
rules problem, the definition [25] can be described as follows:  
Let I = {i1, i2, i3,…, in} be a set of items. Let D = {T1, T2, T3,…, Tm} be a set of 
the transection T, where T is a unique transaction number called TID; and each 
transaction T in database D is a set of items I, such that T ⊆ I. This X ⇒ Y rule 
is an implication form of the association rules mining, where X ⊂ I and Y ⊂ I 
then X ∩ Y = ∅. X is referred to as the antecedent item of the association rules 
(left-hand-side or LHS), whereas Y is referred to as a consequent item (right-
hand-side or RHS) [3] in which the parameters are of great importance. The 
minimum support threshold values (Min_sup) and the minimum confidence 
threshold value (Min_conf), respectively, are expressed as a percentage. The 
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Min_sup value is used to count each item set in the database. If an item set has a 
value greater than or equal to the Min_sup value (as specified by the user), it 
will be a frequent item set. The Min_conf value measures the strength of the 
association rule of the entire database transaction containing both X and Y. 
Likewise, if the association rules have a value greater than or equal to the 
Min_conf value, again user-specified, it will be a frequent rule. The Min_sup 
and the Min_conf values are calculated using Eqs. (1) and (2) [3],[23], 
respectively. 
 Support count (X)Support (X)
Totalnumber of Transection in D
=                   (1) 
 
Support count of (X Y)Support (X Y)
Support count of  (X)
⇒
⇒ =                     (2) 
3.3  Concept of the Apriori Algorithm 
Agrawal and Srikant proposed the Apriori algorithm in 1994 [25]. In order to 
find out the frequent item set in the large database, two processes are executed. 
First, the Apriori algorithm generates the candidate item sets (Ck) and calculates 
the support count of each item. Afterwards it generates the frequent item set (Lk) 
and prunes the item sets which fall below the Min_sup value.  
The Apriori algorithm also determines the frequent k-item set (Lk). First, it 
calculates the support count of each item set to generate the candidate item sets 
(C1). Then, it prunes C1 of elements lower than the Min_sup value, allowing the 
frequent item set L1 to be generated. Then, it determines the frequent 2-item sets 
(L2), which are generated from joining L1 with the candidate 2-itemsets (C2). 
Again, pruning C2 of elements lower than the Min_sup value the frequent item 
sets (L2) is generated. This process is repeated until frequent k-item sets can no 
longer be generated. However, the Apriori algorithm properties dictate that 
every subset (k-1) within the frequent k-item set must have originated from the 
frequent item sets. 
4 System Architecture 
The system architecture of the proposed system is shown in Figure 4. The 
proposed system consists of the following entries: MIT-DARPA 1999 data set 
preparation, network traffic data to ARFF conversion, association rules 
procedure, and Snort IDS rule generator procedure.  
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4.1 MIT-DARPA 1999 Data Set Preparation 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed system, we utilized the MIT-
DARPA 1999 data set [26]. However, the data sets were recorded separated by 
one week, named as the 1st week, 2nd week, 3rd week, 4th week, and 5th week 
datasets, respectively. 
We utilized the inside.tcpdump and outside.tcpdump data sets of the 4th and 5th 
week datasets, as they contained both normal and abnormal behavior patterns. 
Additionally, these datasets contain network probe attacks (portsweep, satan, 
msscan, queso, ipsweep, etc.). This paper focuses on the ipsweep type only. We 
installed the Snort IDS version 2.9.2.2 [19] and a Mysql database, based on the 
CentOS 6.4 operating system [27]. As in a previous work [3], we improved the 
Snort IDS rules to record the network traffic data entries into the network traffic 
database found in the next module.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 System Architecture. 
4.2 Network traffic data to ARFF convertor 
After the network traffic data have been recorded into the network traffic 
database, they are converted to arff format in the NetMIC module, before 
entering the data mining process with the Apriori algorithm [3]. 
 
Figure 5 Association rules with Aprori algorithm. 
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Figure 6 Association rules detect procedure. 
4.3 Association Rules with Apriori Algorithm Procedure 
The association rules are generated by defining the dissimilar parameters of the 
attribute number, the minimum support value (Min_sup), and the minimum 
confidence value (Min_conf), as shown in Figure 5. However, after the 
association rules have been processed some rules will maintain the same 
attribute, yet are placed in a different position. The same attributes remain 
distinct from each other, as shown in Figure 6. The association rules of each day 
of the 4th week were then combined. If similar association rules were found, 
only one was selected (likewise with each day of the 5th week). After this the 
unique association rules of the 4th week and 5th week were combined. Again, if 
similar association rules were found, only one was selected. The association 
rules were then used to generate the Snort IDS rules.  
Table 1 shows the number of rules from the association rules technique of the 
ICMP protocol within several parameter conditions. There exists a negative 
correlation between the minimum support values (Min_sup %) and the total 
number of association rules (total rules). That is to say, when the minimum 
support value increases, the total number of association rules decreases. And 
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likewise, as the number of attributes increases, the maximum Min_sup (%) 
decreases as well as the total number of association rules. 
Table 1   Association rules number of the ICMP protocol. 
Attribut
 
Min_sup (%) Min_conf (%) Total Rules 
 10 100 448 
 20 100 194 
 30 100 106 
 40 100 49 
6 50 100 49 
 60 100 8 
 70 100 1 
 80 100 1 
 10 100 211 
 20 100 88 
7 30 100 52 
 40 100 15 
 50 100 15 
 60 100 1 
 10 100 61 
 20 100 26 
8 30 100 15 
 40 100 2 
 50 100 2 
 10 100 8 
9 20 100 3 
  30 100 2 
4.4 Snort IDS Rules Generator Procedure 
Figure 7 shows the Snort IDS rules generator procedure. The association rules 
of the defined parameter’s entries are used to generate the Snort IDS rules by 
the MinSIC module for detecting network probe attacks. Figure 8 shows an 
example of a Snort IDS rules generator. In this example, the source address, 
destination address, source port, and destination port are assigned as “any”.  
5 Performance Evaluations 
In this section, we describe the procedure of the performance evaluation of the 
proposed system. The performance evaluation is divided into two parts: 
classified network probe attacks (ipsweep type) and Snort IDS rules evaluation.     
5.1 Classified Network Probe Attacks The Ipsweep Type 
In this research, both the inside.tcpdump and outside.tcpdump files of the 4th 
week and 5th week dataset from the MIT-DARPA 1999 datasets were utilized 
for the performance evaluation. Additionally, they consist of DOS, U2R, R2L, 
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and network probe attacks. In previous studies, classifications of probe attacks 
included portsweep, ipsweep, Satan, Is_domain, ntinfoscan, and queso [5]. This 
paper, however, focuses only on the ipsweep type of network probe attacks.  
 
 
Figure 7 Snort IDS rules generator procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Transformed Snort IDS rules with MinSIC module. 
Table 2   Summary of the network probe attack of the ipsweep type. 
Week Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Total Attacks In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out 
4 0 - - 0 0 0 0 10 0 268 278 
5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 - 15 
Table 2 summarizes the ipsweep type of network probe attacks. We can see that 
the network probe attacks on Thursday and Friday of the 4th week in the 
outsde.tcpdump (out) file produced a total of 278 attacks. Moreover, Monday 
and Thursday of the 5th week in the outside.tcpdump file produced a total of 15 
attacks. In some circumstances, Monday of the 4th and Friday of the 5th week in 
the outside.tcpdump file, as well as Tuesday of the 4th week in the 
inside.tcpdump file, we were unable to extract files for evaluation of the 
proposed system. 
5.2 Snort IDS Rules Evaluation 
The Snort IDS rules performances were evaluated by utilizing the accuracy 
comparisons procedure, previously described in [5]. Suitable parameters, as 
seen in Table 1, outline the Snort IDS rules as shown in Figure 7. We compared 
and evaluated the performance of the experimental results of the intrusion 
icmp_seq=0 ip_tos=192 icmp_type=3 icmp_code=3 icmp_id=0 
ip_src=2886758420 ip_dst=3232235786 ==> ip_ttl=63 
alert icmp any any -> any any (msg: “ICMP Attemp Attack” ; icmp_seq:0; tos:192; 
itype: 3; icode:3; icmp_id:0; ttl:63; sid: 1000001) 
Association 
rules 
Snort IDS 
Rules 
 
MinSIC 
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detection between the original Snort IDS rules, icmp.rules, and icmp-info.rules 
of the Snort IDS, and the proposed Snort IDS rules.     
We extrapolated an equation from [28] in order to calculate the accuracy rate of 
our proposed system, which is expressed as a percentage. The True Positive 
Percentage (TPP) is expressed in Eq. (3). A true positive is the detection of 
abnormal traffic that is accurately and correctly detected. A higher TPP value 
indicates better performance.  
 TPTrue Positive Percentage 100
TP  FN
= ×
+
                       (3) 
The True Negative Percentage (TNP) is expressed in Eq. (4). A true negative is 
the detection of normal traffic that is detected as a normal traffic. A higher TNP 
indicates better performance.  
 100
FP  TN
TNPercentage Negative True ×
+
=                     (4) 
The False Positive Percentage (FPP) is expressed in Eq. (5). A false positive is 
normal traffic that is incorrectly detected as abnormal traffic. A lower FPP 
indicates better performance. 
 
100
TN  FP
FPPercentage Positive False ×
+
=                      (5) 
The False Negative Percentage (FNP) is expressed in Eq. (6). A false negative 
is abnormal traffic that is incorrectly detected as normal traffic. A lower FNP 
indicates better performance.  
 100
TP  FN
FNPercentage Negative False ×
+
=                     (6) 
Accuracy is expressed in Eq. (7), which is used to calculate the proposed system 
performance.  
 TP  TNAccuracy 100
TP  TN  FP  FN 
+
= ×
+ + +
                  (7) 
Table 3 summarizes the performance evolution of each parameter condition of 
the Snort IDS rules from the association rules data mining technique for the 4th 
week. The performance of each parameter condition is explained as follows:  
Regarding TPP when the parameters were assigned 6, 7, and 8 attributes, 
Min_sup was 10% and Min_conf was 100%. The Snort IDS successfully 
detected the network probe attacks, as the TPP achieved was 100%. On the 
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other hand, when the parameter was assigned 7 and 8 attributes, the Snort IDS 
detection of network probe attacks achieved a TPP of 98.20%.  
The TNP with a parameter of 8 attributes (Min_sup at 10% and Min_conf at 
100%) achieved the highest performance, with 98.67%. However, at 7 
attributes, the TNP performed the lowest, with 43.96%.  
The FPP with a parameter of 8 attributes (Min_sup at 10% and Min_conf at 
100%) achieved the highest performance, with 1.32%. When the parameter was 
assigned 7 attributes, the FPP scored the lowest performance, with 56.04%.  
Table 3   Summary of the network traffic data detection on 4th week. 
Attribute Min_sup (%) 
Min_conf 
(%) 
TPP 
(%) 
TNP 
(%) 
FPP 
(%) 
FNP 
(%) 
Accuracy 
(%) 
6 
10 100 100.00 49.23 50.77 0.00 50.44 
20 100 0.00 47.32 52.68 100.00 46.20 
30 100 0.00 52.96 47.04 100.00 51.70 
40 100 0.00 54.99 45.01 100.00 53.68 
50 100 0.00 54.99 45.01 100.00 53.68 
7 
10 100 98.20 43.96 56.04 1.80 45.24 
20 100 0.00 54.17 45.83 100.00 52.89 
30 100 0.00 54.99 45.01 100.00 53.68 
8 10 100 98.20 98.68 1.32 1.80 98.67 
Table 4   Summary of the network traffic data detection on 5th week. 
Attribute Min_sup (%) 
Min_conf 
(%) 
TPP 
(%) 
TNP 
(%) 
FPP 
(%) 
FNP 
(%) 
Accuracy 
(%) 
6 
10 100 100.00 61.38 38.62 0.00 61.38 
20 100 0.00 63.35 36.65 100.00 63.31 
30 100 0.00 63.32 36.68 100.00 63.28 
40 100 0.00 72.12 27.88 100.00 72.07 
50 100 0.00 72.12 27.88 100.00 72.07 
7 
10 100 66.67 62.54 37.46 33.33 62.53 
20 100 0.00 62.47 32.53 100.00 67.43 
30 100 0.00 72.12 27.88 100.00 72.07 
8 10 100 66.67 98.72 1.28 33.33 98.70 
 
At a parameter of 6 attributes (Min_sup at 10% and Min_conf at 100%), the 
FNP achieved the highest performance with 0.00%. At both 7 and 8 attributes 
the FNP archived a slightly lesser performance of 1.80%. At all other Min_sup 
values, the FNP received the lowest performance, with 100%. 
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In calculating the accuracy of the proposed system’s performance (Min_sup at 
10% and Min_conf at 100%), the Snort IDS achieved the highest performance, 
with 98.67%, when assigned 8 attributes. Conversely, with a parameter of 7 
attributes, the Snort IDS achieved the lowest performance, with 45.24%. 
Table 4 summarizes the performance evolution of the network data detection for 
the 5th week. The performance of each parameter condition is explained as 
follows: 
The TPP with 6 attributes assigned as the parameter (Min_sup at 10% and 
Min_conf at 100%) detected all network probe attacks, as the TPP archived 
100%. The results, similar to that of week 4, differed when the parameters of 7 
and 8 attributes were assigned. TPP performance achieved 66.67%. 
Regarding TNP when the parameter was assigned 8 attributes (Min_sup at 10% 
and Min_conf at 100%), the highest performance achieved was 98.72%. A 
parameter of 7 attributes achieved the lowest performance, with 61.38% (versus 
43.96% in week 4).  
The FPP when assigned a parameter of 8 attributes (Min_sup at 10% and 
Min_conf at 100%) achieved the highest performance, with 1.28%. The lowest 
performance, 37.46%, was achieved with a parameter of 7 attributes. 
FNP with 6 attributes (Min_sup at 10% and Min_conf at 100%) achieved the 
highest performance (similar to that of week 4) with 0.00%. However, with 
parameters assigned at 7 and 8 attributes, the FNP scored the lowest 
performance, with 33.33%.  
In calculating the accuracy of the proposed system’s performance in the fifth 
week with 8 attributes (Min_sup at 10% and Min_conf at 100%), the Snort IDS 
achieved the highest performance (almost identical to that of the 4th week) with 
98.67%. Similar to the results of the 4th week, with a parameter of 7 attributes, 
the Snort IDS again achieved the lowest performance, this time with 45.24%.  
Table 5 illustrates the performance evaluation of the original Snort IDS rules, 
comparing the 4th and 5th week datasets. The original Snort IDS rules’ accuracy 
was very high (and very similar) in both the 4th and the 5th week, at 98.36% and 
99.77% respectively. Similarities also occurred in the TNP of the 4th week 
(99.78%) and the 5th week (99.81%). However, the original Snort IDS rules 
were unable to detect all network probe attacks. The TPP was 0.00% in both the 
4th and the 5th week, and the FPP of the 4th and the 5th week were 0.22% and 
0.19% respectively. The FNPs of the 4th and the 5th week were both 100%.  
 Improving Snort IDS Rules for Network Probe Attacks 247 
 
Table 5   Performance evaluation of original Snort IDS rules. 
Week TPP (%) 
TNP 
(%) 
FPP 
(%) 
FNP 
(%) Accuracy (%) 
4 0.00 99.78 0.22 100.00 98.36 
5 0.00 99.81 0.19 100.00 99.77 
Table 6   Performance evaluation of icmp.rules and icmp-info.rules of Snort 
IDS. 
Week TPP (%) 
TNP 
(%) 
FPP 
(%) 
FNP 
(%) Accuracy (%) 
4 100.00 47.36 52.64 0.00 47.99 
5 100.00 46.34 53.66 0.00 46.35 
Table 7   Performance comparison of proposed and original system. 
 
Week 
Original 
Snort IDS 
rules (%) 
icmp.rules and icmp- 
info.rules of the Snort 
IDS rules (%) 
Proposed Snort- 
IDS rules (%) 
TPP 4 0.00 100.00 98.20 5 0.00 100.00 66.67 
TNP 4 99.78 47.36 98.68 5 99.81 46.34 98.72 
FPP 4 0.22 52.64 1.32 5 0.19 53.66 1.28 
FNP 4 100.00 0.00 1.80 5 100.00 0.00 33.33 
Accuracy 4 98.36 47.99 98.67 5 99.77 46.35 98.70 
Table 6 evaluates the performance of the icmp.rules and the icmp-info.rules of 
the Snort IDS for the 4th and 5th week datasets. The TPP of both the 4th week and 
the 5th week achieved 100%. However, the FPP scored low performances for 
both weeks with 52.67% and 53.66%, respectively. This implies that normal 
traffic was erroneously detected as abnormal traffic. 
Table 7 shows a performance comparison of the original system, incorporating 
the original Snort IDS rules as well as the icmp.rules, and icmp-info.rules 
(within the Snort IDS rules) with the proposed system. The proposed system 
applied the association rules technique of data mining. In the comparison of all 
Snort IDS rules, we found that by assigning a parameter of 8 attributes 
(Min_sup at 10% and Min_conf at 100%), the proposed system achieved the 
greatest accuracy.  
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The performance evaluation found that the proposed system achieved a 
proximate accuracy equal with that of the original Snort IDS rules, as well as 
higher performance in both TPP and FNP. The proposed system also achieved 
higher performances in TNP and FPP, as well as greater accuracy compared 
with the icmp.rules and icmp-info.rules of the Snort IDS. 
6 Conclusion and Future Work 
Intrusion detection systems are efficient network security tools for detecting and 
monitoring network traffic data. They generate an alert when abnormal behavior 
patterns are matched to existing rules. However, because the IDS may have high 
false positive and false negative values, we have proposed an alternative 
system, incorporating data mining of the association rules within the Snort IDS. 
The proposed system was thoroughly tested and compared to the original Snort 
IDS Rules as well as icmp.rules and icmp-info.rules within the Snort IDS, the 
proposed system proved to be more efficient and more accurate. In future work, 
we will explore other data mining techniques for intrusion detection systems for 
DoS, U2R, and R2L. 
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